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Using the framework of street-level bureaucracy theory, this paper examines the 
work of medical doctors in assessing eligibility for disability grants (DGs) in 
South Africa. Observations of doctor-patient encounters showed that, despite the 
state’s attempts to standardise disability assessment, significant variation  
remains in doctors’ decision-making. I argue that doctors’ divergence from 
rules and guidelines is driven by differences between the government’s 
bureaucratic framing of disability and the alternative frames used by doctors for 
making sense of cases and thinking about disability, illness and employability in 
the South African context.  Doctors’ framing of DG cases was shaped by their 
social and cultural backgrounds and dispositions, their professional knowledge 
and values, and their broader discursive framings of rights and social justice. 
This paper makes an original empirical contribution to the study of conceptions 
of disability as a category of the ‘deserving’ poor in a context of high poverty. It 
also highlights the relationship and potential conflicts between professional 
expertise, social norms and values, and bureaucratic rules at the street-level, 
and shows how this shapes policy implementation and the ensuing ‘gap’ 





The South African government provides a relatively generous1 non-contributory 
pension called the disability grant (DG) of R1500 ($100) a month people who 
are disabled and unable to work or to support themselves financially through 
other means (SASSA, 2016). Applicants’ disability must be confirmed by a 
                                                 
1 This ‘relative generosity’ refers to the size of these benefits relative to the minimum wage. 
The DG is set at less than the minimum wage across all sectors, but pays more than many 
informal sector jobs and is very close to the minimum wage in a number of sectors. It is also 
generous relative to the size of disability benefits available in most developing countries 




medical doctor, turning doctors into gatekeepers.2 Although doctors are typically 
considered a professional group, as disability assessors doctors operate as street-
level bureaucrats (Lipsky, 2010)3 for the South African Social Security Agency, 
which is responsible for administering the DG and other social grants. Street-
level bureaucrats are characterised by their direct (frontline) interaction with the 
public and the high degree of discretion and autonomy that they have in 
practically applying the benefits and sanctions of institutions to citizens 
(Maynard-Moody & Portillo, 2010). Doctors are positioned as street-level 
bureaucrats to the extent that they work at the interface between citizens and the 
state, have an important role in the allocation of state benefits and are subject to 
the bureaucratic constraints and regulations of social security and health policy. 
Like other street-level bureaucrats, they work in resource-constrained settings 
where they have to make complex decisions quickly, with limited information 
and time. 
  
Lipsky (2010) argued that street-level bureaucrats effectively create policy 
through the ways in which they exercise agency as they interpret and apply 
policy in their daily work, often in ways that make their difficult work easier. 
Studies of street-level bureaucracy draw our attention to how professional 
knowledge and experience is put into action through practical reasoning 
processes. It also, as Rowe (2012: 15) notes, “takes us further, to the context-
dependent ethics of public service (the phronesis)”. There is an extensive 
literature on the frontline workers who make the daily decisions about “who gets 
what, when and how” (Laswell, 1936) in European and North American welfare 
states, but there are few studies of how frontline public service workers 
contribute to how policy is realised on the ground in developing countries (see 
Hoag, 2010; and Bierschenk & de Sardan, 2014 for some exceptions). There 
have also been few applications of the street-level bureaucracy concept to 
healthcare policy implementation, both in general and in South Africa in 
particular (Walker & Gilson, 2004; and Muller, 2016 are exceptions). 
  
In making decisions about patients’ eligibility for grants, doctors perform two 
roles - the role of medical professional, with its attendant norms, responsibilities 
and knowledge-forms, and the role of bureaucrat within the structure of 
                                                 
2 Doctors make a recommendation on a client’s eligibility based on their clinical assessment, 
but the final decision is made by SASSA who also administer the means test and perform 
other administrative checks (e.g. age, citizenship or permanence residence). However, 
claimants cannot not receive the grant without a recommendation from a doctor and SASSA 
administrators are not trained to interrogate the medical information or assess it in relation to 
other information (e.g. level of education, skills etc.), applicants would typically receive the 
grant if they passed the means test. Therefore, in most cases doctors’ recommendations DG 
determined whether a patient received a grant. 




SASSA’s disability management system, with its rules and processes. They are 
also human actors with their own agency and set of personal experiences, norms, 
moral dispositions and notions of social justice, who are likely to have subjective 
reactions to claimants and use their discretion to insert their own ideas and 
values into the assessment process (Barnes & Prior, 2009). As Kaufman argued, 
bureaucrats enter organisations with “opinions, values, preferences and their own 
interpretations of the world” (1960: 80-81) that influence their behaviour within 
them. 
 
There are long-standing concerns amongst policy-makers, implementers and 
civil society that DG assessments are highly subjective and open to bias and 
fraud on the part of both doctors and patients (Kelly, 2013). Whilst overt 
incidents of fraud (e.g. falsified documents and bribes to doctors) has been easier 
to address with the establishment of SASSA and introduction of new 
management procedures aimed at preventing fraud, regulating the more regular 
but often divergent decisions doctors make has been more challenging. One of 
the reasons why DG assessments are so difficult to regulate is because disability 
is a complex and multi-dimensional concept. 
  
Ambiguities in defining disability and difficulties in making binary distinctions 
between disabled and non-disabled people make it difficult to use disability as an 
administrative category for allocating social rights (Altman, 2001; Bolderson et 
al., 2002; Priestley, 2010). The South African context creates a number of 
additional difficulties in accurately targeting intended beneficiaries. These 
contextual problems include: high levels of structural unemployment and poverty, 
grant generosity (relative to earnings) inherited from the apartheid welfare state, 
weak social protection provisioning for working-age adults and an HIV epidemic 
which has greatly escalated demand for the grant. These factors have created 
high demand for the DG, including from those who are not disabled, 
complicating the decision-making of doctors. 
  
Vague policy and medical guidelines leave wide scope for interpretation and the 
boundaries between what doctors should and should not consider in their 
assessments are often unclear. As well as individual work capacity, employability 
is a function of both personal characteristics (e.g. skills, education, personality) and 
employer demand (Garsten & Jacobsson, 2013). This means medical factors are 
only a component of what makes someone able or unable to work and support 
themselves. The significant poverty faced by most claimants also introduces 
ethical dilemmas into the assessment as doctors must make decisions that have 
large implications on the lives of those applicants (de Paoli, 2012). 
 
This paper explores the difficult position of doctors within the DG system, focusing 




patients, especially in spaces between the rules, where specialist medical 
knowledge and SASSA guidelines do not offer clear answers on eligibility and 
the degree of disability is open to interpretation. In doing so, it explores the gaps 
between social policy, medical knowledge and practice. 
  
I argue that doctors’ varying decisions reflect different ways of framing the 
disability ‘problem’ and therefore interpreting both guidelines and the cases in 
front of them. As claimants often do not fit neatly into the disabled category, 
doctors rely on their own categorisation systems or schemas to make decisions 
about who should get disability grants and to draw boundaries between who is 
and is not disabled. These are influenced both by their medical expertise and by 
social constructions which they as individuals tacitly subscribe to. Whilst 
these framings of disability are, as Lipsky (2010) and others have argued, shaped 
by the structure of their work and coping strategies they develop to deal with 
time constraints and other work pressures, they are also related to normative 
ideas about their role as moral and professional agents. 
  
While some scholars (Maynard-Moody & Musheno, 2003; Dubois, 2010; 
Hasenfeld, 2000) have paid attention to the influence of norms and values on 
street-level decisions, in general the literature on street-level bureaucrats has 
paid insufficient attention to how these are used to categorise people and 
therefore to ration services (Harrits & Møller, 2011). Although Lipsky (2010) 
has argued that street-level bureaucrats are governed by professional and 
occupational ideology, his work and the street-level literature in general, has 
paid little attention to groups like doctors who have significant discretion and 
most strongly associate with a defined set of professional norms and values 
(Hupe, 2007; Evans, 2010). The concept of framing captures the pluralism of 
subjectivities, norms and ideas that ground street-level actions, whilst allowing 
us to observe and explain patterns emerging in street-level decisions. It is also 
useful in examining the relationship and potential conflicts between professional 
expertise, social norms and values, and bureaucratic rules. 
   
After proposing a number of frames that doctors use in their decision-making, I 
discuss the effects that these frames have on how doctors make decisions and 
treat claimants, and how they intersect with or contradict the specific eligibility 
conditions laid down by SASSA and their obligations to the state. In doing so, I 
will also reflect on the misalignments between the daily realities of doctor-
patient interactions and SASSA’s bureaucratic ‘script’, and what this means for 








Doctors as gatekeepers and bureaucrats  
 
Doctors routinely make decisions on how to allocate and, in some cases, ration 
health resources to the public, using both their expert biomedical knowledge and 
guided by national health policy and organisational policies. The field of 
medical sociology has long demonstrated that medical settings are sites of social 
categorisation and that medical decisions and resource-allocation in healthcare 
are socially complex processes shaped by socio-cultural, moral and professional 
values, as well as context-specific circumstance (Nurok & Henckes, 2009). The 
specific literature on the sociology of micro-level rationing in medicine, 
demonstrates that rationing decisions that affect health outcomes are made in the 
same way as other categorisations in medicine (Light & Hughes, 2001; Vassy, 
2001; Allen, 2004; Mizrahi, 1985), and is relevant to this discussion in that DG 
assessments are primarily about limiting (or rationing) access to only those with 
significant disabilities. This literature shows that doctors often become caught in 
moral dilemmas and are required to juggle the radically different logics and 
principles of clinical judgement, cost-effectiveness, fairness and their individual 
obligation to the patient and reach some sort of equilibrium (Willems, 2001).  
 
This places doctors in what Schön describes as the “swampy lowland” of 
professional practice - a space of messy, confusing but usually important 
problems that cannot be solved with technical knowledge alone (1987: 3). 
Decision-making in this context is an interpretive process that relies on doctors’ 
clinical experiences and knowledge of the individual patient as well as medical 
protocol or bureaucratic guidelines. 
  
Clinical judgment is often described as tacit, action-oriented and context-
dependent, rather than a product of technical rationality (Montgomery, 2006; 
Freidson, 1970; Greenhalgh, 1999; Boshuizen & Schmidt, 1992; Mattingly, 
1994; Loftus & Higgs, 2008). The practice of medicine therefore requires a 
degree of judgement or wisdom or phronesis, an interpretive capacity and 
intellectual virtue that enables doctors to combine medical knowledge and 
practical skill to address the context-bound particularities and ethical aspects of 
individual cases (Beresford, 1991; Siegler, 2000; Montgomery, 2006).4 This 
capacity is not easily captured by science, learnt in medical school or bound by 
rules; rather, it is learnt through experience and practice and represents what is 
often described as the ‘art’ of doctoring (Meershoek et al., 2007). This more 
intuitive and situational aspect of medical practice is not captured or easily 
governed by medical or administrative rules and guidelines and can conflict with 
administrative, “box ticking” rationality that organisations like SASSA promote. 
                                                 
4 Oakeshott’s (1962) concept of practical knowledge has parallels with the concept of 




As high-status professionals with considerable professional power and expert 
knowledge, doctors have more discretion and expect more autonomy than many 
other types of frontline workers. As professionals are generally socialized to 
comply with the norms and standards of the profession that they belong to 
(Scott, 1966), they are also more likely to resist outside supervision or control 
(Freidson, 2001), making their work difficult to manage through rules and 
managerial tactics. This suspicion of bureaucratic rules does not mean that 
doctors do not develop routine ways of dealing with patients. In their general 
work managing medical cases, doctors develop personal working models for 
managing problems that they encounter on a regular basis (Lock, 1985).  
 
Medical training is not only a process of knowledge acquisition but also a 
process of professional socialisation that initiates doctors into a ‘moral 
community’ (Durkheim, 1992) of professionals committed to explicitly 
normative goals and norms of acceptable behaviour. Doctors learn from other 
doctors how to interact with and treat patients and how to deal with ethical 
dilemmas; and through this process doctors come to see and interpret things in 
very particular ways. Being a doctor, therefore, becomes a “way of being in the 
world” (Higgs & Loftus, 2008: 214). Parsons (1951) imagined doctors in a 
normative or moral role, positioning them as altruistic, caring, trustworthy, 
community-oriented, but ultimately neutral agents. Although this trust in doctor 
has been eroded to some extent, the idea that medicine is a moral enterprise and 
doctors should behave in objective and ethical ways remains central to how the 
profession positions itself and what society expects from it (Freidson, 1970; 
Freidson & Lorber, 1972; Kleinman, 1995). Doctors are therefore trusted to 
make scientifically objective and unbiased decisions and have traditionally been 
given significant autonomy and discretion in terms of how they make decisions 
and deal with ethical dilemmas. Doctors are, nevertheless, human agents who 
have the capacity for extreme bias and moral failure.  
 
The small literature on the role of doctors as third-party assessors in social 
security and occupational health medicine and the doctor-patient relationships 
that form in these settings have shown that doctors experience conflict in their 
simultaneous roles of patient advocate, physician and gatekeepers to benefits and 
struggle to determine whose interests they should be protecting or promoting 
(Wynne-Jones et al., 2010; Berg et al., 2000; Dodier, 1994, 1998; Meershoek et 
al., 2007, 2012; Wilde, 2014; Eikenaar et al., 2015; Stone, 1979, 1984; Mashaw, 
1983; Wainwright et al., 2015; Cheraghi-Sohi & Calnan, 2013). It also 
highlights how important professional expertise and socialisation are in shaping 
how doctors approach the rules and policy structures (McDonald, 2002; 
Checkland et al., 2004; Meershoek et al., 2007; Eikenaar et al., 2015). The 
limited number of studies that refer to or focus on doctors’ involvement in the 




frustrations in conducting assessments (Baron, 1992; Segar, 1994; Tumbo, 2008; 





Data was collected in the Western Cape Province of South Africa over a period 
of eleven months between 2013 and 2014.  At the time, DG assessments in the 
Western Cape were conducted at all levels of the healthcare system by both 
treating doctors in hospitals in the context of inpatient or outpatient work and by 
dedicated SASSA assessors in community clinics. I worked in twelve different 
community clinics in rural and urban areas, sampled to maximise demographic 
variation in terms of race and income. I also conducted fieldwork at outpatient 
clinics in three hospitals, one of which was a psychiatric hospital, working in the 
departments of cardiology, neurology, neurosurgery, orthopaedics, psychiatry 
and infectious diseases. 
 
Twenty-four doctors, who conducted DG assessments during the course of their 
work as treating doctors (12) in hospitals or as dedicated SASSA assessors (12) 
were involved in the study. I directly observed the work of seventeen doctors 
over one or two days. In cases where direct observation was not appropriate or 
not possible, I conducted in-depth interviews with doctors. In total, 216 
consultations were observed, of which 196 were disability assessments. A 
description of the doctors involved in the study is provided in the Appendix. 
Interviews and focus groups were also conducted with occupational therapists, 
social workers, nurses and SASSA officials, including the medical quality 
assurance officer.  
 
Over the course of the day, the doctor and I would discuss patient cases and the 
rationale for their decision-making, usually between patient consultations. 
Observing the doctor-patient interaction created opportunities to learn how 
doctors engaged with and examined patients, how patients presented both their 
medical and social cases to doctors and how doctors responded to patient 
behaviour and characteristics. At the end of the day I would conduct a more 
formal interview to reflect on the cases seen and address any remaining 
questions I had about their decision-making and general approach. Combining 
observation and interviews was useful in stimulating discussions with doctors 
that were grounded in the concrete particularities of real cases and provided 
opportunities for me to probe their understanding of DG cases. On the other 
hand, my presence in the room may have influenced how doctors made decisions 
and treated patients because doctors may not have wanted to be seen as making 




minimise my influence on doctors’ behavior and the perception that I may be there 
to ‘judge’ their work by reinforcing my student and lay-person role. 
  
Ethical approval to for the study was obtained from the University of Cape 
Town Human Research Ethics Committee. In order to preserve the anonymity of 




Framework governing DG assessment  
 
According to the Social Assistance Act of 2004, someone is eligible for a DG if 
“he or she is, owing to a physical or mental disability, unfit to obtain by virtue of 
any service, employment or profession the means needed to enable him or her to 
provide for his or her maintenance.” Section 3(c) of the 2008 Regulations to the 
Social Assistance Act further defines eligibility in relation to employability and 
an applicant is eligible if “he or she is unable to enter the open labour market or 
support himself or herself in light of his or her skills and ability to work” and 
does not unreasonably refuse to any income generating employment within his 
or her capabilities. Disability itself is not defined in the Act or its regulations and 
the lack of a proper definition means that it remains open to interpretation. 
Given failed attempts to better-define and measure disability in legislation 
(Kelly, 2013), SASSA attempts to standardize disability assessments through 
managerial processes. 
  
SASSA has developed a set of medical assessment guidelines to structure 
doctors’ thinking and limit their discretion in interpreting disability. These 
guidelines provide conceptual definitions of impairment, disability and 
employability. To help doctors estimate impairment based on diagnosis, the 
guidelines include a basic table of condition-specific directives in its guidelines 
for determining the percentage of impairment present based on diagnosis. Based 
on the tables, doctors then categorised the overall severity of impairment as 
‘none’ (0%), ‘mild’ (<25%), ‘moderate’ (25 – 40%) or ‘severe’ (>40%). Those 
with mild impairments are not eligible, those with moderate impairments may 
qualify based on other factors that influence employability and those with severe 
impairments are considered eligible regardless of other factors. The SASSA tables 
are basic and provide broad impairment ranges and no instruction on how to 
combine multiple diagnoses or information on what tests should be used to 
establish impairment.  
 
The guidelines also provide no instruction on establishing function or assessing 
Activities of Daily Living and are not aligned with information requested on the 




guidelines make provision for considering non-medical factors (age, educational 
attainment, intellectual capacity, skills, reasonableness of accommodation by an 
employer) in cases of moderate impairment, they do not provide any guidance 
on how they should be considered in relation to medical factors in determining 
work capacity and employability. They do, however, emphasise that impairment 
should remain central to decision-making: “certainly most of our population 
lives in very poor social circumstances that cause a lot of suffering, but this 
alone does not constitute grounds for a disability grant” (SASSA, n.d.: 5).  
 
Doctors employed as SASSA assessors receive guidelines and a cursory training 
on how to conduct assessments. Treating doctors in hospitals, who have little or 
no contact with SASSA are provided with no official guidance in this regard and 
most had not seen any guidelines. Those that had access to guidelines were 
divided in their opinions on their usefulness, while some were happy to directly 
apply them, many thought them incomplete or impractical and did not help 
assist them in the most difficult aspect of assessment – deciding how a medical 
diagnosis actually impacts an individual’s ability to work. In the latter case, the 
disconnect between the guidelines and the actual reasoning required to make 
decisions resulted in SASSA guidelines being dismissed by some doctors as 
arbitrary and unhelpful. While doctors in this study appreciated efforts to 
standardise the system and make their decision-making around DGs easier and 
more objective, guidelines are not sufficient to guide doctors’ practice and 
limited oversight made it easy for doctors to ignore them (see Kelly, 
forthcoming). 
 
The ambiguity of the disability category, weaknesses in or non-availability of 
the guidelines and limited oversight meant that doctors retained significant 
discretion in conducting assessments. This is not inherently problematic and it is 
arguably undesirable to completely eliminate professional discretion, but in this 
case doctors’ lack of thorough professional training in disability assessment 
meant they were faced with significant uncertainty in their decision-making. 
Therefore, in cases where a claimant’s ability to work depended on contextual 
determinants which they did not know of or have the ability to assess, doctors 
developed their own rules of thumb to determine claimants’ employability that 
were influenced by their own ideas and assessments of “deservingness”.  
 
 
An analysis of doctors’ decision making 
 
During disability assessments, doctors have to make sense of and categorise a 
claimant’s individual case and make a recommendation that can be supported by 
clinical evidence. They do this by engaging with information from multiple 




theory of the situation at hand. This process is both cognitive and conceptual and 
one that I argue relies on the interactive and intersubjective process of framing. 
Framing is the active process of arranging medical knowledge, SASSA’s rules 
and standards, and professional and personal norms and values to answer the 
question of eligibility in individual cases. 
 
When a patient enters the room, a doctor has to think through two different 
things. Firstly, “what type of applicant is this?” and secondly, “should I 
recommend a disability grant for this person?” The first question is essentially 
the framing question that Goffman (1974: 8) argued individuals unconsciously 
ask when faced with any situation: “what is it that is going on here?” The 
second question, although directly connected to the first, is a more strategic one: 
“how do I deal with or treat this person?” The way in which doctors understand 
the context of the DG application defines what information they look out for 
when conducting an assessment, how they interpret this information and 
ultimately what decision they make. In other words, doctors reach different 
conclusions about patient eligibility based on how they decide to frame a 
situation (Berg et al., 2000; Dodier, 1998). 
 
The terms ‘frame’ and ‘framing’ are widely used by diverse disciplines that 
include social theory and sociology, cognitive science, communication theory, 
policy studies and political and finance (amongst others). It is therefore 
necessary to clarify how I am employing this term and what specific literature I 
have drawn on in applying this idea to DG assessments. 
 
Goffman (1974) argued that within a given context, people need to define a 
situation in order to know how to act and interact with others. Drawing on 
Bateson’s (1955) work on animal play, he called this process framing. Frames 
allow people to “locate, perceive, identify and label” social experiences and help 
to guide further action (Goffman, 1974: 21). Giddens (1984) took up Goffman’s 
notion of framing and used it in developing his theory of structuration. Whilst 
Goffman’s work has mainly been applied to understanding social interactions in 
face-to-face encounters, Giddens’s work has mainly influenced theories of 
institutions. He understood frames to be “clusters of rules which help to 
constitute and regulate activities, defining them as activities of a certain sort and 
as subject to a given range of sanctions” (Giddens, 1984: 87). Like Goffman, he 
saw frames as interpretive schemas used in interactions, that both structured 
interactions and could also be transformed by reflective and knowledgeable 
social actors: “Framing as constitutive of, and constricted by, encounters ‘makes  
sense’ of the activities in which participants engage, both for themselves and 






Separately from Goffman, but also drawing on Bateson’s work in his work on 
reflective professional practice, Schön (1983, 1987) argued that when 
professionals make decisions they engage in a process of “naming and framing”, 
latching onto particular pieces of information to make decisions. 
  
‘Through the complementary acts of naming and framing, the 
practitioner selects things for attention, guided by an appreciation of 
the situation that gives it coherence and sets a direction for action . 
So problem setting is an ontological process – in Nelson 
Goodman’s (1978) memorable word – a form of worldmaking. 
Depending on our disciplinary backgrounds, organizational roles, 
past histories, interests, and political/economic perspectives, we 
frame problems in different ways’ (Schön, 1987: 4). 
 
Together with Rein, Schön also applied the notion of framing to analysing the 
policy-making process (Schön & Rein, 1994). Drawing on and extending this 
work, Van Hulst & Yanow (2014) emphasise that framing is a dynamic and 
action-oriented process of making sense of and organising prior knowledge and 
values. Frames guide emerging action in intersubjective situations, and “actors 
bring their own prior knowledge (from experiences, education, and other 
sources) to situational sense-making” (Van Hulst & Yanow, 2014: 8). In the case 
of doctors, they bring to their interactions with patients or claimants a 
classificatory system built from their medical knowledge, clinical experience 
and social and cultural knowledge – what Harrits & Møller (2011: 241) call an 
“embodied habitus”. This is a set of categorical systems and a position in systems 
of symbolic and social relations that is ingrained in the bodies of street-level 
bureaucrats (ibid). Also influenced by Bourdieusien notions of habitus, Dubois 
(2010), shows how the dispositions, as well as individual identities, personalities 
and social roles of both bureaucrats and clients structure their interactions and, 
consequently, bureaucratic decision-making. 
  
I take a frame to mean an interpretive schema that social agents use to make 
sense of their situation and guide their actions (in this case, decision-making), 
which is shaped by their background and dispositions as well their professional 
knowledge and norms. For example, a middle-class white cardiologist brings to 
DG assessments her own perspectives and experiences of both the medical and 
social world, which are informed by her race, class-position, culture, gender, 
specialist training and collection of past experiences with patients, which she 
uses to navigate the assessment process and which will inform her practice and 
decision-making. Following Van Hulst & Yanow’s (2014) proposition, I have 
understood framing as an interactive, often tacit process that, in the case of 
disability grant assessments, facilitates decision-making. The decision frames 




regulations and doctors’ responsibilities as medical professionals, moral and 
social agents that establish the boundaries and constraints for decision-making. 
  
My research suggests that, whilst they were neither fixed nor exclusive, four main 
frames informed doctors’ decision-making and behaviour towards DG claimants 
in Cape Town: the bureaucratic frame, the clinical frame, the moral frame and 
the social frame, all of which represent different arrangements of rules and 
definitions of disability, employability, need, entitlement and deservingness. 
 
This typology of frames is influenced by Nicholas Dodier’s (1994, 1998) work 
on frames. Applying the notion of framing to decision-making in the practice of 
occupational medicine, Dodier (1998: 53) argued that, “a person adjusts to a 
situation not by using discrete resources, but through arrangements of resources 
(words, rules, objects) in which past experiences are inscribed, that is, through 
frames”. Dodier put forward a number of different frames, including the 
administrative, clinical, psychological and solicitude frames, as alternative ways 
of understanding and assessing patient’s complaints and attributing health-based 
‘rights’ to patients in occupational medicine. His concept of frames has been 
employed in Human’s (2011) study of doctors’ practical use of treatment 
protocols in HIV clinics in South Africa. Eikenaar et al. (2015) has also applied 
this concept to explore the normative aspects of professional judgements made 
by street-level bureaucrats involved in work reintegration programmes in the 
Netherlands. Although not drawing on Dodier’s work, Fassin (2012) presents a 
similar typology of local justice in medical decision-making around 
humanitarian-based immigration based on professional, political, deontological 
and ethical factors. 
 
The likelihood of a doctor adopting a certain frame was shaped by their habitus 
and the nature of their social interaction with an individual patient. Particular 
influences on doctors’ adoption of certain frames were their medical speciality 
and training, institutional environment, personal norms and values and notions of 
justice, social background, approach to patient care, previous experiences with 
patients requesting the grant (especially negative ones), and views about the 













The table below presents the broad distinctions between the four different 
frames used by doctors. 
  


























justice / human 
rights 
 
Political Neutral Neutral Ideology is 
influential 





Focus Collective / 
state 











Citizen-agent Community / 
public health 
professionals 





Although I present four framing options, these were neither discrete nor 
mutually exclusive ways of making sense of cases. Capable of reflection, doctors 
are social actors able to apply “a wide range of different and even incompatible 
schemas and have access to heterogeneous arrays of resources” (Sewell, 1992: 
17). When practically applied in medicine, social norms and values may clash or 
contradict each other, shift or coexist (Timmermans & Haas, 2008: 671). 
Doctors moved between or combined different frames and thinking was very 
often shaped by their specific interactions with individuals, the particularities of 
certain cases and material circumstances. Doctors might also frame their 
decisions in ways that help them to cope with the stressors and constraints of the 
system, for instance framing eligibility as a purely administrative issue to avoid 
feeling sorry for people, as was sometimes the case with the bureaucratic frame. 
 
The way in which doctors framed disability claims inclined them towards 
handling cases in ways which may coincide or conflict with SASSA’s framing 




frames doctors used affected their attitude - and adherence to – SASSA’s rules. 
   
For instance, doctors who framed disability as a multi-dimensional or social 
phenomenon might prioritise the consideration of economic, social and 
environmental factors over strict adherence to SASSA’s guidelines and might 
stretch or bend the rules to accommodate them. The same might apply to a 
doctor who believed that the rules undermined their broader commitment to 
professional medical ethics. On the other hand, a doctor who valued 
administrative justice, equity and impartiality might focus on strictly applying 
rules and guidelines, refusing to make individual exceptions. This is not to say 
that doctors simply do what they wish - they are of course constrained by their 
legal and professional obligations. But, where they have discretion, their framing 
of certain situations might make them more or less likely to rigidly apply or bend 
or stretch the rules to accommodate people that meet their own private 
understanding of disability but not the state’s. There is also an important 
difference between conscious rule-breaking (which was less common) and 
interpreting a general rule in a way that makes the best possible case for one’s 
patient (Blustein, 2012: 252). 
 
While doctors did not admit to falsifying information to support their 
recommendations, in some cases they might exaggerate them because of their 
social circumstances.  
 
‘I think in terms of the way in which you fill in a form you can 
actually make it sound worse than it is. I've had a couple of 
patients where they're borderline so you've sort of given them the 
benefit of the doubt because of their social circumstances and their 
social circumstances do unfortunately affect their healthcare and so 
for example, if you're hypertensive you really should be able to do 
your job, but you know if you have to go to the clinic every month it 
becomes really difficult when you have difficult social 
circumstances’ (Dr Harvey, interview, 15 April 2014). 
 
One doctor in the study described the distinction between a flexible, sympathetic 
doctor, who bent the rules in favour of the patient, and a doctor who strictly 
applied SASSA guidelines and focused exclusively on clinical factors, as the 
difference between being a ‘hard’ or a ‘soft’ doctor. This distinction is useful, 
not because I want to provide a structuralist analysis of doctors’ decision-
making, but because ‘hardness’ and ‘softness’ provide a useful description of the 
two different sets of behavioural options or strategies available to doctors when 
they interact with patients and make decisions. The majority of doctors sat on a 
continuum between soft and hard and varied between strictness and leniency, 




situation. In short, doctors pursued strategies for action based on how they 
understood a particular case as deserving, and such exceeded the bounds of 
medical evaluation criteria. This does not mean that eligibility was merely a 
social construct or a function of culture. Even if doctors interpreted cases 
differently, their decisions were, for the most part, rationalised by the physical 
realities of patients’ bodies and their medical expertise. 
 
It is also important to note that doctors, especially those working as SASSA 
assessors who had to conduct assessments day after day as consistently as 
possible, did not necessarily have the time or inclination to think through the 
complexities of each case. Doctors were therefore likely to develop quick and 
standardised ways of identifying and treating certain clients. In this way frames 
can harden into routine ways of classifying clients, treating clients based on 
existing categories or stereotypes (e.g. the malingerer). 
 
 
Bureaucratic framing  
 
SASSA’s guidelines promote the objective categorisation of patients according 
to set criteria, simplifying decision-making by effectively limiting the options or 
possible solutions available. Doctors strictly applying SASSA’s directives in 
their work can be said to be employing a bureaucratic frame. The bureaucratic 
frame is the equivalent of what Dubois (2010) would call bureaucratic 
formalism, what Jonsson (1998) called a bureaucratic administrator strategy. It 
also bears strong similarities to what Eikenaar et al. (2015) called a procedural 
frame of reference. 
 
Using this frame, medical knowledge is applied in a reductive and objectifying 
way, placing patients into categories and applying a strictly biomedical approach 
to disability as advised in the guidelines. Disability grants were understood as a 
specific intervention for a certain group, not a general poverty intervention and 
in their gatekeeping role doctors saw it as their responsibility to protect the 
boundaries of the disability category by using their medical knowledge to detect 
malingerers, fakers and defaulters. 
  
Doctors can easily apply SASSA’s bureaucratic framework in cases where 
patients clearly did or did not qualify on medical grounds. Most SASSA 
assessors did so. What distinguished doctors with a bureaucratic ethos from 
others was that even when a patient’s eligibility was less clear, these doctors 
would lean towards conservative decision-making, seeking out further clinical 
evidence through objective tests or referrals rather than considering more 
contextual and subjective factors. Applying a kind of deontological ethics, they 




individual circumstance. In short, they would err on the side of SASSA rather 
than the patient. While in fact the guidelines do provide some leeway for the use 
of professional discretion, doctors approaching the assessment of a patient 
through this frame positioned themselves as SASSA workers, denying that they 
had any discretion and claiming that they were strictly following procedures 
and interpreting guidelines in a very conservative and restrictive way. Doctors 
working as SASSA assessors, who were specifically employed to conduct 
assessments and had received SASSA training were most likely to employ a 
bureaucratic frame in their decision-making. 
 
Dr Bury, for example, framed his decision in completely bureaucratic terms. 
When I met him, he been conducting assessments for SASSA for eight years and 
took his job as an assessor very seriously. He strictly applied SASSA’s 
guidelines and impairment tables to make decisions and avoided considering any 
non-medical or contextual factors, even in cases of moderate impairment when 
the SASSA guidelines gave him discretion to consider factors such as the age, 
education level or employment history of a claimant. According to SASSA 
guidelines, doctors should consider disability and employability in terms of a 
person’s physical ability to do any sort of work in the open labour market, 
regardless of the availability of employment. Applying this principle, he 
understood ‘open labour market’ to mean an individual’s ability to do any kind 
of work, regardless of whether they actually had the skills or education to do 
this. He expressed disinterest in the subjective experiences of claimants and 
justified this by reiterating that his role was to conduct a medical assessment, 
not consider other factors related to disability. When he had doubts about a 
patient’s eligibility, he erred on the side of caution, refusing to recommend the 
grant because he was a taxpayer. Legally, those defaulting on treatment are not 
eligible for the DG. SASSA did, however, expect that the medical ethics of 
beneficence and non-maleficence be brought to bear in cases where defaulting 
patients were severely ill, provided that it could be clinically justified (Dr 
Marite, interview, 2014 June 27). Dr Bury was, however, unwilling to make 
these exceptions, even in the case of advanced AIDS. 
  
Their strict application of the rules did not mean that doctors applying this frame 
were necessarily insensitive to claimants’ suffering. For some it was a 
professional ethical stance (Zacka, 2015) in that they were doing what they were 
both paid to and legally required to do. The bureaucratic frame is grounded in 
the idea of equal treatment or what Mashaw has called ‘bureaucratic justice’ – 
the notion that applying the rules in the same way in every case is the most 
procedurally fair and just way to handle DG assessments. In this way, the 






For doctors, applying the rules in a very literal way could also be a way to cope 
with what was otherwise a very stressful and morally taxing job. For example, 
ones of the reasons Dr Bury so rigidly applied a medical was approach was 
because: 
 
‘…as soon as you consider anything else then it’s not about disease 
or dysfunction and that’s the only thing. Look at the records and 
examine the patient if necessary –that’s that. I don’t look at 
anything else because then you might feel sorry for the patient and 
you say “yes” to a grant when it’s not necessary’. 
 
Invoking rules and denying discretion or professional autonomy can be used 
by frontline workers as a defence “against the possibility that they might be 
able to act more as clients would wish” (Lipsky, 2010: 149). “Bureaucracy offers 
a formal structure to withdraw from social relationships and concomitant 
feelings of reciprocity and social duty” (Bartels, 2013: 470). Thus, even 
choosing to “go by the book is a discretionary judgment” (Maynard-Moody & 
Portillo, 2010: 19).  Hupe & Hill (2007) argue that professions may impose 
rules upon themselves to manage their work and would use the guidelines as a 
way to legitimise their decisions to patients who questioned their decisions. 
For example, in the US Cassell (2004) found that medical doctors may ignore 
patient’s stories out of concern that they may interfere with their objectivity and 
thus, patient care. Taking a hardline approach could make SASSA assessors 
very unpopular with claimants who perceived them to be inflexible and 
insensitive and found assessments depersonalizing (see Kelly, 2016). 
 
  
Clinical Framing  
 
In contrast to bureaucratic framing, doctors employing a clinical frame were less 
concerned with SASSA’s rules, guidelines and set procedures and instead made 
decisions based on what Bourdieu described as their ‘feel for the game’ 
(Bourdieu, 1990). Doctors employing a clinical frame generally justified the 
need for DG on a clinical basis, based on a claimant’s medical history and 
individual circumstances. While SASSA wants doctors to make standardized 
decisions that provide grants to only the most serious cases, medical 
professionals are trained to respond to individual need. Medical professionals 
also have a set of norms of acceptable behaviour, and standards and ethics that 
guide their practice; one of which is putting the patient first. Their strongly 
engrained professional values and commitment to patients’ well-being could also 
result in doctors feeling torn between their goals as bureaucrats and 





Using the US disability program as an example, Mashaw (1983) argues that 
these differences between a bureaucratic rationality and professional judgment 
result in different conceptions of justice and can result in professionals being cast 
as subversive to bureaucratic ends.  In this study, subversion was particularly 
likely when a doctor was assessing his or her own patient and less likely in cases 
where doctors worked as third-party assessors. This was because doctors in 
hospital outpatient settings had little contact with SASSA and felt little 
commitment to adhering to its criteria, privileging their own experience-based 
clinical judgement instead. It is for this reason that SASSA is moving towards a 
model that separates the assessing doctor and the treating doctor. Nevertheless, 
this dilemma remained significant for doctors participating in the study. 
 
It is important to note that not all doctors have the same training and clinical 
experience or professional and intellectual approach to the practice of medicine, 
particularly in relation to the psychosocial aspects of care. Professional 
judgement therefore cannot be understood as a singular rationality. Ethnographic 
research has shown that professional beliefs and perspectives on medical 
decisions may vary depending on position in hospital structure (Nurok & 
Henckes, 2009) and specialty area (Mol, 2002). Such beliefs or “practice 
ideologies” (Hasenfeld, 2000) were also learned through the organizational 
environment doctors found themselves a part of, whether it be through 
interactions with SASSA officials and other SASSA doctors during training or 
with other colleagues (especially senior doctors) in hospitals. As Atkinson 
(1995) argues, we cannot look at doctors’ decision-making exclusively in terms 
of what happens in their consultation rooms during their interactions with 
patients. Rather, their decisions are also shaped by what he calls ‘medical talk’ – 
the collegial interactions that take place in medical settings such as conversations 
with other doctors, medical meetings and ward rounds. 
  
Doctors using a clinical frame differed in their response to claims based on how 
they conceptualised their role and responsibilities as medical professionals in 
relation to disability assessments. There were doctors who saw their role in 
patient care as limited to the biomedical aspects and took a hardline approach to 
DG assessments, focused entirely on medical impairment, resulting in similar 
outcomes to those adopting the bureaucratic frame. Others, with a more holistic 
and humanistic approach, considered psycho-social factors and patients’ individual 
circumstances in their decision-making. 
  
As medical thinking has evolved in the last two decades, doctors have been 
encouraged to think more holistically about patient care and in terms of a 
biopsychosocial model of medicine (Engel, 1977), especially in the context of 
chronic illness. Doctors, particular younger doctors who had been exposed to 




the assessment process and most likely to disagree with SASSA’s guidelines, 
which were strongly focused on diagnostic categories. As one doctor noted: “it’s  
got nothing to do with whether they've got HIV or HIV and TB or 
osteoarthritis. What is their state of mind and body and can they work?” (Dr 
Brown, interview, 2014 April 4). 
 
For these doctors, optimal clinical management of patients extended beyond just 
medical intervention to include other non-medical issues that impacted on the 
health of the patient. As one doctor noted, “It’s never purely medical. You can 
make the argument that not having money is going to affect their health, 
although they are not disabled as such.” 
  
In these cases, a DG was considered a way to address social determinants of 
health or address health system failures. Doctors whose primary role was to treat 
patients were particularly likely to make exceptions for individual patients where 
they thought the grant could improve health outcomes. In this way, DGs were 
included as part of their treatment intervention – a way to fund transport to the 
hospital, to attend follow-up appointments and fetch medication, and to ensure 
adequate nutrition to recover their health and alleviate psychological stress. 
Particularly in the field of mental health, it was seen as helping people get out of 
a vicious cycle of financial despair and enabling patients to get their lives back in 
order so that they could find employment. This, as one psychiatrist explained, 
often became complicated when patients had been working very hard to recover, 
but were still unable to find work and asked for their grants to be renewed. In 
these circumstances it was hard to justify following SASSA’s regulations 
knowing they would undermine the patient’s newly recovered health and 
wellbeing. 
  
This feeling was widely shared and one doctor explained the approach of his 
colleagues as follows: 
 
‘They do understand that the patients are often unemployed and that 
it is a process for them to get to us. Although the patients are not 
necessarily physically disabled, they are disabled by their disease. 
They will give the patient a 6 or 12 month grant and there is 
difficulty about loopholes – the reality is that they are sick and 
unemployed and need to get to the hospital and the grant plugs that 
hole. Some of them don’t necessarily deserve the grant but you put 
them on a temporary grant. You put them on a temporary grant while 
they recover – although sometimes by the time they get the grant 
they are already better’ (Xhobani, email correspondence, 23 





At the same time, professional values could conflict with the idea of grants as 
many valorized work on the basis that it was essential for psychological well-
being and thinking that receiving a DG could be psychologically ‘disabling’. 
This made them hesitant to recommend permanent grants when there was any 
(even small) potential for claimants to recover. Although not necessarily 
blaming individuals for their ‘dependence’ on the state, they saw the DG as 
perpetuating a type of dependent mindset that disadvantaged or ‘disabled 
people’. This is a view also held by some disability rights activists that have 
criticized the government for focusing on social grants rather than empowering 
people to work (Gatharim, 2008). 
  
Generally, doctors saw taking one’s health and recovery seriously as an 
important individual and moral responsibility and were frustrated by patients 
who were non-compliant or not motivated to recover and were thus failing to 
fulfill the responsibilities of the ‘sick role’ (Parsons, 1951). Nevertheless, most 
doctors disagreed with SASSA’s objectifying simplification of the complex 
nature of patient adherence issues and felt uncomfortable ‘punishing’ claimants 
for non-compliance when there were usually multiple underlying issues. They 
therefore did not refuse to recommend grants for non-compliant patients whom 
they felt otherwise qualified and needed the grant to recover their health and 
would use the grant to motivate compliance, especially in cases of HIV and TB. 
 
Not all doctors took such a holistic approach to medicine. Some understood their 
role as medical professionals as strictly limited to biomedicine and the treatment 
of injury and disease. Even if they recognised that poverty and demand for the 
grant was a systemic rather than an individual failing, many felt the social, 
economic and environmental position of patients did not concern them as 
medical professionals. 
 
Fassin (2008) suggests (although perhaps too sweepingly) that because doctors 
see themselves as technicians and scientists rather than humanists, they are more 
interested in curative activities and interesting cases than in the social 
dimensions of care. Good et al. (2005), has suggested that the culture of 
medicine privileges time and efficiency and that doctors will therefore avoid 
‘problem’ patients, including those with complex social issues. For some, taking 
a technical approach, can be a way to avoid the complexity of thinking through 
ethical questions (Abrahams, 2006: 2).  Criticising his colleagues, one doctor 
argued that doctors were not interested in disability cases because these were 
essentially people that were “falling apart” and there was little that could be 
done from them medically (Dr Brown, interview, April 2014). In one large 
academic hospital, known for its highly competitive working environment, social 
workers reported that some doctors saw DG assessments as ‘beneath’ them. 




professionals is related to their distance from patients, which is one of the 
reasons the ‘chore’ of disability assessments was often passed to interns and 
junior doctors. 
 
With less interest in the psycho-social aspects of care and complicated personal 
or social issues, more clinically-focused doctors were more likely to focus on 
purely objectively assessing a patient’s physical state and function and refuse to 
engage with other issues. Although this bears similarities to bureaucratic 
framing, their clinical assessments would not necessarily align with SASSA’s 
guidelines. Other aspects of care were seen as the responsibility of social 
workers and doctors would frequently interrupt patients who were sharing their 
subjective experiences, telling them that they were only concerned with their 
medical issues. Some medical specialists in hospitals totally refused to conduct 
assessments for their own patients, seeing it as a waste of their time and scarce 
medical resources and, perhaps not understanding the amount of time and 
money that this would cost claimants,5 instructed patients to visit their local 
clinic where they would be seen by a SASSA assessor instead. 
  
This is not to say that by attempting to be objective doctors are necessarily 
insensitive to the social and economic context of patients, as one reminded me: 
“Doctors make enormous personal, social and financial sacrifices by being 
doctors, so it is inherent (for most) to want to help the patient”. Rather, these 
doctors acknowledged their limited capacity to fix claimants’ social and 
economic issues, and as one of his colleagues commented, “it is not our 





In assessing patients for DGs, doctors are effectively making decisions on how 
to allocate the state’s resources. In many ways these are ethical decisions 
because they affect how resources are distributed in society. Implicit in these 
allocative decisions is the idea that some people ‘deserve’ DGs whilst others do 
not. According to Hasenfeld (2000) this makes turns the process of making these 
kinds of categorical decisions in street-level work into ‘moral work’.  
 
These moral categorisations of who ‘deserves’ social grants have been defined to 
a certain extent by the state through legislation and regulations and have been 
institutionalised within SASSA. However, frontline workers often make their 
                                                 
5 Aside from the potential costs of transport, claimants would have to wait in very long 
queues at SASSA to receive an appointment with a SASSA doctor and then spend hours 




own moral judgments in their categorising work that either undermine or 
reinforce these state categories. Maynard-Moody & Musheno argue that in street-
level work, “identity based normative judgments determine which and how rules, 
procedures and policy are applied” (2003: 155).  
 
Doctors are rarely (if ever) neutral agents. They enter the assessment process 
with a set of existing subjectivities and biases that influences their decision-
making. Although as agents of the state doctors should follow rules and 
procedures in dealing with clients, in reality they “like everybody else, have 
personal standards of whether or not someone is deserving” (Lipsky, 2010: 23). 
According to Bourdieu, “agents are both classified and classifiers” (Bourdieu, 
1987 in Harrits & Møller, 2011) and therefore doctors are themselves part of the 
categorical system. Street-level bureaucrats therefore cannot be seen as outside-
observing agents and social categorization is reproduced in street-level work. 
More simply stated: street-level bureaucrats always act “as human beings 
confronting other human beings.” (Harrits & Møller, 2011: 242).  
 
Numerous sociological studies have shown that medical values of ‘non-
judgmental regard’ and beneficence are not always adhered to and that moral 
evaluation and the designation of patients into ‘good’, ‘interesting’, ‘bad’ and 
‘rubbish’ patients is a regular part of medical settings which influences how 
patients are treated (Roth, 1963; Strong, 1979; Jeffrey, 1979; Stein, 1990). 
Doctors rely strongly on pattern recognition, making them highly likely to 
stereotype patients and classify some as deviant and less deserving of care and 
attention than others (Jeffrey, 1979; Groopman, 2007). Moral assumptions made 
about patients tend to derive from judgements about their social worth as 
individuals, their responsibility for creating their own conditions of ill-health and 
poverty, their degree of amenability to change and their own desired end results, 
and the degree to which view they view themselves as object or subject in terms 
of agency (Hasenfeld, 2000: 332). In his book on the culture of medicine in the 
United States, Stein (1990: 98) called this an “unofficial, moralistic taxonomy of 
types of patients”. This particularly likely in resource constrained or emergency 
settings, as has shown to be the case in a number of South African hospitals and 
clinics (Le Marcis & Grard, 2015; Gilson, 2004; Gibson, 2004; Walker & 
Gilson, 2004; Fassin, 2008; Schneider, 2010). Moral and social evaluations of 
claimants’ worth are also common in disability compensation claims, where 
doctors are less likely to trust patients’ intentions (Hickel, 2001). 
 
In the case of the DG, beliefs about fairness strongly influenced doctors’ 
decision-making and doctors using a moral frame thought about their decisions 
in moral terms. Although not necessarily exclusively, doctors often used moral 
framing to make decisions at times where medical eligibility was not completely 




of ‘just dessert’. Mechanic (1997: 81) argues that moral concepts help to organize 
and interpret and give coherence in situations of uncertainty and confusing 
information, which is often the case in DG assessments.  
  
Doctors considering DG eligibility in moral terms may be less inclined to 
recommend the grant for those who they feel are responsible for their own 
poverty and illness and deemed to be taking advantage of the system, and more 
inclined towards generosity in cases where they see patients as worthy of support 
for reasons of being victims to external misfortune or bad luck, for example. 
Research on South African’s attitudes towards redistribution shows that South 
Africans clearly distinguish between people who are deserving and undeserving 
of social assistance. Disabled people, including people with AIDS are considered 
as falling into the category of deserving of welfare assistance (Seekings, 2007, 
2008a, 2010). In general, doctors in this study also believed the sick and 
disabled were deserving of state support. Negative attitudes that doctors had 
towards certain categories of ‘undeserving’ DG claimants can therefore be seen 
as doubts about the genuineness of their disability and inability to work rather 
than a belief that disabled people as a group are undeserving. 
  
Moral judgements also had political aspects and doctors’ ideological beliefs 
about the value and effectiveness of the South African social grant system and 
poverty alleviation policy also shaped how doctor framed eligibility. Whilst no 
doctor in the study was totally opposed to a social grant system, many were 
concerned that it was being abused by lazy work-shy people, and that the 
government was spending too much money on social grants which created a 
culture of entitlement and dependency, especially amongst the youth. 
 
‘Dr Soet said that she has heard from another doctor that many 
Eastern countries there is no social security for pensioners or the 
disabled and expressed the view that “people here are so ungrateful” 
saying: “South Africa is a lazy country. Those in Eastern countries 
are so productive – they work full days and are so productive and 
they don’t seem so unhappy – they are not living in squalor and 
have food on the table”’ (Field notes, 2014 February 12). 
 
Dr Soet’s statement partly signals her belief in a ‘culture’ of poverty, in which 
‘living in squalor’ is based on values and life choices and dependency on 
welfare. This was echoed in the words of a doctor from a West African who 
reported, “in my country there is no grant, you must go work”, imputing that the 
grant system in South Africa had contributed to a culture of dependency or 






At a training session SASSA held for its assessors, a number of doctor 
contrasted the attitudes of South Africans towards work against those of 
hardworking foreigners. 
 
Dr Y: “Young people (South Africans) are in the hospital just 
queuing for grants but Somalis and Zimbabweans are working.” 
Dr X: “It’s up to us.”    
Dr Y: “That dependency.”    
Dr B: “It’s about social deprivation and ‘now I am entitled 
because society has deprived me’ – the grant reinforces this - you 
are deprived so we will give you the grant poor thing.” 
 
These represent only a few of the many times that doctors argued that DGs create 
dependency and incentives for patients to remain ill, reward laziness, represent 
an unsustainable cost to the taxpayer (including doctors themselves) or clog up 
the healthcare system. These demonstrate a set of concerns about the broader 
social assistance system: its costs, its abuse, the disjuncture between the rights 
people claimed and their willingness to accept their responsibilities as citizens 
and so-called perverse incentives. These arguments are framed by bigger policy 
debates and stories of welfare ‘scroungers’ in both the South African and 
international media. The idea of an ‘undeserving’ poor “lacking the moral 
fibre to enjoy the benefits of economic growth” (Everatt, 2008: 293) has 
played a central role in the public discourse about poverty in South Africa. It 
also reflects middle class values surrounding work and individual responsibility 
and an insensitivity to structural factors such as high levels of unemployment, 
which for the most part is involuntary. Doctors’ comments on the cost of grants 
to the taxpayer and the growing numbers of social grants also reflect a real 
limitation on the willingness to support redistributive policies like social grants. 
 
Although doctors seem to have been influenced by broader anti-welfare 
discourses, it is difficult to establish the extent to which it was these discourses 
shaped their decision-making, rather than their legitimate efforts to perform the 
gatekeeping work that SASSA expects of them. This negative ‘talk’ about 
grants does not necessarily reflect how doctors actually interacted with patients 
or made decisions about DGs, but does point to a frustration with and lack of 
support for a system in which they played an integral part. In other words, it was 
possible for a doctor to feel immensely frustrated with the system but 
simultaneously feel tremendous empathy towards individual patients. Research 
has shown that people may had hold complex and internally conflicting views 
regarding distributive justice and the type of welfare state they believe is helpful 
for both the country and individuals, which has been shown in the case of the 





Concern about disability ‘fakers’ and malingerers has existed for as long as 
states have offered programs that compensate work-place injuries, military 
veterans or provided social insurance or assistance to ill or disabled people 
(Stone, 1984). It is part of a doctor’s role to be alert to and guard against this, but 
there is also an implicitly moral judgment made about the archetypal malingerer 
or faker – people who one doctor called “chancers and rubbish who ‘spin stories’ 
to get the grant. Based on their frequent encounters with what they believed to be 
malingering patients, they actively guarded against illegitimate claims and 
‘abuse’ of the grant system. This has also been shown to be the case in other 
South African studies (Macgregor, 2006; Segar, 1994). Even doctors with more 
positive views on DGs and social welfare felt that some claimants abused the 
system and that the large number of non-eligible people that applied for DGs, 
burdened both the health and welfare system by absorbing resources that could 
be better spent on creating a better DG system for the ‘truly’ disabled. 
Sometimes this led doctors to be unfairly strict with patients and hospital social 
workers reported acting as patient advocates in cases where they felt that a 
doctor was unfairly refusing to recommend the grant. 
  
As well as broader discourses, doctors’ framing choices were influenced by their 
past experiences with patients. One doctor mentioned that although perhaps only a 
minority of people ‘abused’ social grants, the nature of their work meant that they 
tended to encounter more of this ‘minority’ than the average person, which 
made him cynical about DG requests. Doctors had seen people coming in drunk 
and injured after grant payment day, had dealt with people who had stopped 
taking their medication or refused treatment to access grants, encountered people 
who applied repeatedly for grants and had experienced bullying from patients 
who wanted them to recommend the grant (see Kelly, 2016). They had also seen 
patients who had overcome difficult circumstances, illnesses and disabilities that 
were not ‘dependent’ on grants and tended to compare them to those who were. 
For example, one doctor contrasted the attitude of an older woman with end-
stage rheumatoid arthritis, motivated to do absolutely anything to improve, with 
that of a young, overweight 31-year-old woman with back pain “who someone 
had stupidly given the DG” in the past and who refused to leave until he 
recommended its renewal. He described her entering the clinic “with her 
jewellery and her smart handbag” and said, “she managed to drive herself here, 
walk up the stairs and find the Kentucky Fried Chicken okay, but felt she could 
not work because someone had told her she couldn’t”. He had spent thirty 
minutes of his time trying to encourage her to work and had found the 
experience very frustrating. “The only thing that was broken was her attitude. 
Someone had given her the temporary grant for six months and now she felt she 
needed it for life”. He added, “sometimes the compassion of the doctor shoots 
the person in the foot”. While for the most part, doctors’ experiences made them 




guilt at having been irritated by a patient and rejecting an application, only to 
later discover that he had chronic renal failure. This made her more inclined to 
be more sympathetic towards people requesting DGs.  
 
As the above examples indicate, as well as general ideas and biases, the 
individual characteristics of claimants strongly influenced decision-making. 
Based on how patients looked, spoke and behaved, doctors placed patients 
into socially constructed categories or made moralistic judgments about an 
individual patient’s character and their relative deservingness. This is not to 
say that patients fit neatly into categories and I agree with Maynard-Moody 
& Musheno’s argument that citizen-client worthiness is a continuum and that 
many clients present a mixture of worthy and unworthy characteristics (2003: 
111). The comparative and theoretical literature on street-level bureaucrats 
identifies street- level bureaucrats as responding positively or negatively to the 
physical attributes, nationality, educational level, perceived morality, attitudes, 
and character types of applicants (Rice, 2012; Maynard-Moody & Musheno, 
2003; Horton, 2004; Dubois, 2010). 
 
Looking at eligibility through a moral frame, claimant characteristics such as 
age, appearance, previous work history, self-motivation, compliance to treatment 
and responsibility for their health and economic position and family support 
structure became important factors in establishing desert. Given South Africa’s 
apartheid past, including the racially segregated medical system and persistent 
social and economic segregation between races in South Africa, it would be 
reasonable to assume that racial stereotypes held by doctors in this study would 
influence who they understood to be the ‘deserving’ poor. Research on 
physicians in the US has shown that some associate negative attributes such as 
non-compliance, low intelligence and drug and alcohol abuse with black and 
immigrant populations, which affects physicians’ engagement with patients and 
their decision-making and medical decision-making (Van Ryn & Burke, 2000; 
Krupat et al., 1999; Schulman et al., 1999). This did not appear to be the case 
with doctors I observed.67 
                                                 
6 Seekings (2007, 2008a, 2010) found that despite South Africa’s history as a racist state, 
attitudes towards distributive justice in Cape Town do not appear to be shaped by racial 
considerations. White respondents were more generous in the amounts of money they 
suggested should be paid towards the unemployed, which Seekings attributed to guilt about 
enduring racial economic inequality and which may have contributed to how some white 
doctors framed disability. 
7 As racism is now considered socially unacceptable and medical professionals are expected 
to be objective in their decision-making, it was unlikely that doctors would have admitted 
any racial bias. This did not mean that doctors’ ideas about the deserving and undeserving 
poor were not tinged with racial bias or that overtly racist doctors do not exist. The quality 
assurance officer told me a few isolated incidences of doctors who had refused to 




It is more likely that doctors’ understandings of disability and poverty and their 
interpretations of particular claimant characteristics were informed more by their 
middle- class backgrounds than racial stereotypes. Doctors were noticeably more 
friendly and trusting towards patients that displayed middle-class attributes or 
behaved in ways that aligned with middle-class values. As Harrits & Moller 
(2011: 239) argue:  
 
‘the category of middle class is related not only to possessing a certain 
amount of cultural and economic capital, or to a specific lifestyle and 
consumption pattern, but also to a specific taste and morality, 
associated with, for example, the “right” way to carry oneself, to raise 
children and to engage in work’. 
 
These are reinforced when confronted with other categories that are different. 
The habitus of middle-class doctors may make it difficult for them to identify 
with poorer patients and understand their decisions, making them less likely to 
acknowledge structural factors and more likely to attribute poverty and 
unemployment to patient characteristics (e.g. laziness), choice or fault than 
structural factors, leading them to think of individuals as undeserving. This can 
lead to stereotyping and reinforce notions of the ‘culture’ of poverty (Chirayath, 
2007). 
  
Whilst I did not observe doctors discriminating against patients in any direct 
way, these patient characteristics did influence how rigidly or flexibly they 
applied the rules to individual patients. Although doctors attempted to overcome 
negative biases they had towards particular kinds of patients, they were more 
likely to rigidly apply rules if they felt a patient was undeserving. They were 
also more likely to be flexible and generous if they felt sympathetic towards a 
patient that they ‘felt’ was deserving. 
  
Groups seen as particularly undeserving were young people, the previously-
unemployed, those seen as responsible for their poor health and substance 
abusers. Young people were seen as better-able to compete for unskilled jobs, 
gain further education and training or recover their functions and their failure to 
work was attributed to laziness, despite very high levels of youth 
unemployment. Some doctors openly chastised young people for applying, 
telling them that they were young and should find work. 
  
‘The old people, they can’t find jobs, but the young ones…they 
want only money – especially the HIV - I don’t like to give them any 
                                                                                                                                                        





because they can work. The HIV is not…you have HIV and high 
blood sugar I can understand, but HIV on its own…you must go 
work. They don’t want to go work, they are lazy. I tell them also “sisi, 
you are lazy, you must go work”’ (Dr Mulumba, interview, 2014 
February 4). 
 
Doctors sometimes tried to convince claimants that they were capable of work, 
using examples of resilient patients, colleagues, family members or invoking 
tropes of the ‘heroic’ disabled person to demonstrate that it was possible to work 
despite illnesses or physical impairments. The implication was that claimants 
who were claiming work disability with relatively minor impairments were just 
not ‘trying’ hard enough. 
  
A claimant’s contribution to the economy and society was also an important 
factor for many doctors, which also accounts for why young people were seen as 
undeserving. People who had never worked were seen as undeserving for one of 
two reasons: 1) they had never contributed to society through work; and 2) if 
they had been already been unemployed prior to becoming sick or disabled - 
often for many years - why should did they now deserve a grant? A doctor at one 
hospital was so frustrated by this that he stormed into another doctor’s 
consulting room while he was with a patient to voice his anger about patient he 
had just seen who was receiving a permanent grant for rheumatoid arthritis 
despite being unemployed for the previous ten years.  
 
People whose unhealthy lifestyles had contributed to their poor health were also 
considered less deserving. Patients who were overweight, heavy smokers or 
drinkers and had developed chronic diseases such as chronic obstructive 
pulmonary disease, diabetes, hypertension and arthritis were particularly likely 
to be seen as lazy or irresponsible and received little sympathy from doctors, 
especially when they did not make the effort to change their behaviour. Doctors 
expect patients to comply with treatment and take responsibility for their health 
and may feel little moral obligation to treat patients who aspire to the sick role, 
do not look after their health or do not cooperate in getting well; though the legal 
and professional obligation does remain (Nurok & Henckes, 2009). Doctors 
often openly voiced these judgements to patients. For example, one doctor told a 
patient who had been a victim of domestic abuse: “you make poor life choices”. 
 
Doctors often faced patients who became ill or were injured through drug or 
alcohol abuse or involvement in criminal activity such as gangs. Doctors could 
not legally refuse to recommend a grant to someone with a legitimate disability 
regardless of the source of impairment, unless someone was known to be an 
active substance abuser (which automatically disqualified them). Doctors were, 




might use their grant money for ‘questionable’ purposes such as buying alcohol, 
drugs or cigarettes, or who generally were not ‘good’ people. 
 
‘Whereas those patients who are not interested in treatment for a 
medical condition if it doesn't lead to a DG, that believe they deserve a 
DG because they are not employed even though they don't have a 
disability, that make use of tik [methamphetamine] or any other drugs 
and enter the clinic as though they own the place - they can cause a 
change in the [doctor-patient] relationship from their behavior. I 
have been confronted with a gangster patient who refused 
appropriate treatment, whilst stating, “I’ll just get the grant” and 
laughing as he said it, despite understanding that refusing treatment 
may result in the loss of his limb due to complications. If he later 
asked me for a DG I’m certain that I would be reluctant to 
submit the form’ (Taylor, email correspondence, 2014 February 
13). 
 
As much as doctors guarded against the undeserving poor, doctors using a moral 
frame were willing to make exceptions for people that had minor impairments 
who they felt were somehow ‘deserving’ of assistance. During the face-to-face 
encounter of the disability assessment process, doctors ‘bear witness’ not only to 
the disablement of a patient but to the vulnerability and suffering of another 
human being. This may create feelings of responsibility and moral obligation 
towards patients (Olthuis, 1997; Raef, 2006), which could affect how they 
treated them. According to Swartz and Schneider (2006: 243), “it is difficult to 
apply principles of distributive justice when one is faced with the reality of 
poverty”. South African doctors are aware of the impact that decisions to award 
or renew grants can have on the quality of life of patients living in poverty. A 
study of anti-retroviral adherence and the DG (De Paoli et al., 2010) found that 
doctors reported high levels of discomfort at what they described as “feeling like 
God” when making decisions on whether or not to award or re-new grants. In the 
past, doctors regularly recommended grants on humanitarian grounds rather than 
on actual impairment (Kelly, 2013). As a result, the DG has been referred to by 
some as the “ag shame” grant (Interview Margaret Schneider, June 2013). “Ag 
shame” is a commonly used South African expression of sympathy, which 
means something akin to “you poor thing” or “I feel sorry for you”. 
 
These feelings of pity were described by a number of doctors as the ‘sympathy 
factor’, which was intensified in interactions between doctor and patients who 
were visibly poor or in social distress. Although some doctors were able to 
emotionally distance themselves in their assessments or were so clinically 
minded that they were not interested in these issues, some felt real guilt about 




a referral to an overburdened social worker. The doctor working as quality 
assurance officer for SASSA explained how his work is easier than those of 
other doctors because it does not involve seeing the suffering of applicants: 
 
‘I can understand very much that the doctors are very much inclined 
towards patients and there will always be a sympathy factor 
involved. With me too - I know that if I was involved and I was 
looking at somebody... you know you will always look at people's 
social backgrounds and you would probably tend to err on the side of 
the patients. When I do it now, on a desktop, I don't have that 
influence - I don't see the people, I don't see the social circumstances, 
I don't see the poverty. I'm not influenced by that’ (QA officer, 
interview, 2014 March 31). 
 
Doctors were more likely to feel sympathy for older people, mothers with 
children and “ordentlike mense” (decent people) who fell into the category of the 
‘deserving’ poor. This reflects more the more general conceptions of desert held 
by South Africans as well as the overall design of the welfare state. Attitudinal 
surveys conducted in Cape Town showed that respondents considered older 
people more deserving than younger ones and favoured women and people with 
dependents more than men (Seekings, 2008, 2010). The South African state 
treats elderly people as a deserving group and provides non-contributory, means-
tested old age pension for people over sixty, which enjoys general legitimacy in 
South Africa (Seekings, 2010). Underlying this support is the belief that older 
people are less responsible for their poverty because they are disadvantaged by 
worsening health and opportunities for employment as well as the disadvantages 
they experienced in the past under apartheid that prevented them from obtaining 
a decent education or work and made it harder to save for retirement. (Seekings, 
2008). 
 
SASSA is very aware of doctors’ tendency to be particularly sympathetic 
towards older applicants and during a training session held for doctors as 
SASSA staff member said, “you are a human being first – that is the 55 year-old, 
I am asking you to be inhumane.” The case of Dr Brown and Mrs Majola below 
is an example of a doctor framing his decision in terms of deservingness rather 
than medical impairment or function. Dr Brown understood Mrs Majola to be as 
a decent lady who deserved the state’s support, recommending a grant when 
technically she was not eligible. 
 
The doctor turns to me and explains that, based on her file, she has minor 
complaints and that she is getting treatment for painful limbs. After thinking for 
a bit he says, “I could throw her out and make her sell chicken feet [which she 




adds, “She is a decent lady who has been trying”. The clerk chips in that she is 
54 years old and Dr Brown says, “good point, there is not much of a market for 
it”. He decides to recommend a 6-month temporary grant, saying that arthritis is 
about strain and you end up with a condition of ineffective hands and feet and 
“you can’t really do much with that. You can’t sell anything with hands that 
don’t work”. Dr Brown then tells her that she will be getting the grant. Mrs 
Majola becomes emotional and says, in English, “I didn’t have a hope!” Dr 
Brown tells me, “giving hope to people is important.” 
 
Cases like Mrs Majola’s were common and many doctors responded in similar 
ways to Dr Brown, who by fitting her into his framework for understanding 
disability stretched the rules to accommodate her within the system. Doctors 
were sympathetic to patients who were trying to earn their own income or were 
trying to ‘overcome’ their circumstances in some way, seeing them as more 
deserving than those who were categorized as ‘lazy’ and ‘dependent’. 
 
Although doctors may be inclined to feel great sympathy for patients applying 
on the basis of poverty, this did not necessarily define their decision-making and 
doctors would not necessarily deviate from SASSA guidelines. Instead they 
might try to help patients by referring them to social work services; educating, 
encouraging and motivating patients; providing employment suggestions; and in 
one case, collecting and handing out clothes to claimants. Several doctors also 
bent the rules of the Social Relief of Distress award to accommodate patients 
who did not qualify for a grant but were in clear financial need.8 
 
   
Social framing 
 
Doctors employing a social frame typically understood disability in terms of the 
social model of disability rather than in terms of SASSA’s highly medicalised  
model and were more likely to take a public health perspective in their decision-
making. Using this frame of disability, doctors considered both an individual’s 
medical profile and individual characteristics which influence employability 
such as age, education and training, ability to speak English, previous work 
experience and skills. They also considered the structural economic, social and 
environmental factors shaping employability such as the tightness of the labour 
market and opportunities for re-training and employment in relation to these 
individual factors. The economic migration of people from the rural Eastern 
                                                 
8 Doctors are only meant to recommend the SRD on a medical basis to people who are 
declared disabled for a period of less than six months. Doctors tended to recommend it 





Cape to the Western Cape was identified as a major social issue driving the 
demand for disability grants in the province. As one doctor noted, “you often 
have people coming from the Eastern Cape with no education and no English 
ability with HIV and lots of children and that these people will just keep on 
coming – it’s a major social problem” (Field notes, 2014 March 14). The 
implications of ongoing medical treatment might have on claimants’ ability to 
retain a job (e.g. frequent clinic visits, dialysis, transport or care) might also be 
considered.  
 
Doctors recognized that a lack of education and age were major drivers of 
demand for the grant and this seemed to fit the general demographic. Many 
claimants were older and had not progressed beyond primary school. This is 
supported by other studies of DG beneficiaries (Mitra, 2010; Govender & Miji, 
2009; De Koker, 2006) and SOCPEN data (SASSA, 2014). This is unsurprising 
given that the incidence of disability increases with age and the lack of jobs 
available for this section of the population. Without the credentials or skills and 
lacking the social and cultural capital to secure regular and well-paid 
employment in an economy that is becoming increasingly skills- intensive, and 
where most labour-intensive work has been pushed into the precarious informal 
economy; large numbers of unskilled people are only able to obtain precarious 
informal work (Seekings & Nattrass, 2005: 2015). 
 
Given slack labour demand, people perceived to be less productive – older 
people and those with even very mild impairments or manageable illnesses – are 
placed at the back of the job queue and are therefore unlikely to find work 
(Reskin & Roos, 2009). Skills development and training programs largely 
exclude people over forty and older people therefore have little chance of 
improving their employability or moving to another employment sector 
(Interview with occupational therapist, Whitney Hospital).  
 
Recognising the difficulties that older people in particular faced in finding 
employment, doctors often recommended grants for applicants in their fifties 
with mild health conditions that were not necessarily disabling and age was 
perhaps the strongest non-medical factor considered by doctors during 
assessments.9 This differed from the moral framing of older patients in that these 
decisions were rationalized more in terms of ‘employability’ than older patients 
being more ‘deserving’ (although these two conceptions of eligibility may of 
course overlap). Many doctors considered claimants’ eligibility for the DG in 
relation to pension age and are particularly generous towards people who would 
soon qualify for this pension. A number of doctors admitted to seeking out 
                                                 
9 Even doctors who strictly adhered to SASSA’s bureaucratic frame would recommend 
temporary grants for longer than they might have for a younger person or recommend a 




additional conditions such as osteoarthritis in older patients who might not 
otherwise qualify.10  
 
Another important idea in the social framing of disability is the idea that disease 
and disability are socially determined and a product of structural violence 
(Farmer, 2004). For example, the social frame takes into account the 
contribution of South Africa’s apartheid past to current patterns of economic, 
social and, thus, health inequalities in the Western Cape. One doctor commented 
“there is very little that has been done to address social determinants of health 
before patients get to me. Health is a manifestation of everything wrong in 
society”. She felt that recommending a grant was one small thing she could do to 
assist people who were unfairly disadvantaged in life.  
 
This focus on structural factors distinguishes the social frame from a moral 
framing of eligibility. While the moral frame defines deservingness in terms of 
individual agency (and failures of agency), a social frame takes a bigger picture 
view of deservingness, informed by the social structures that drive DG 
applications. 
  
Through this lens, doctors saw a case of a patient who was clearly not eligible 
for a grant more as a symptom of bigger social and economic problems than an 
individual case of malingering. The social frame is very similar to the more 
holistic version of the clinical frame, which considers psychosocial factors and 
the provision of income-support as part of health interventions, but is different 
in that it emphasizes issues of rights, equality and social justice rather than just 
the health outcomes of individual patients. This reflects the kind of redistributive 
justice rhetoric promoted by the South African constitution, which promises 
socio-economic rights, including social security to South Africans.  
 
Dr Du Toit, whose approach most strongly exemplified a social framing of 
disability, had worked for many years in a European country with a strong welfare 
state. This experience had strongly shaped his understanding of eligibility and he 
expressed a strong rights-based approach to social grants and social welfare 
generally. While he recognised that there were difficulties in managing the DG 
system given the high demand for grants, he was against restrictive assessment 
policies, believing that “individual rights should not be subsumed by the greater 
problems in the system” (Field notes, 2014 March 14). He was highly critical of 
the DG system in terms of the nature of the assessment process and the approach 
of his colleagues to health and social issues, believing them to be punitive and 
                                                 
10 The use of grants for disabled people being used as proxy old age pensions is not a new 
phenomenon. Gevers’ (2014) historical account of the emergence of old age pensions shows 
that the ex-gratia Blind Grant for Africans, introduced in 1937 as the first monetary social 




short-sighted in their approach. He was particularly perturbed by doctors who, 
rigidly applying SASSA directives would not take social factors such as age into 
account in their decision-making, using the example of a doctor he knew not 
giving a grant to a 59-year old woman with arthritis because she could 
technically still participate in the labour market.  
 
He argued that South African doctors had become hardened to poverty and the 
severity of diseases such as HIV/AIDS and tuberculosis, which he argued had 
become normal and uninteresting to doctors. He felt that while manageable, these 
diseases still significantly impact people’s well-being and participation in 
society. Therefore, rather than objectifying patients, he believed that it was 
important to listen to people’s stories.  
  
This more inclusive approach often resulted in decisions that diverged from 
SASSA’s guidelines and rules. Although guilt and discomfort about the poverty 
they so regularly encountered was an important part of doctors’ decision-
making, these decisions were not necessarily driven by sympathy or 
humanitarianism. Those using a social frame generally felt that their assessment 
criteria were appropriately grounded in the social model of disability and were 
made on the basis of people’s actual ability to participate in the labour market. 
Considering social factors did not make medical factors unimportant and doctors 
using a social frame did not simply recommend the grant to anyone who was 
unemployed. Dr Du Toit, for example, acknowledged that his decision-making 
broke with SASSA’s medical model but argued that he had never received a 
work assessment back from an occupational therapist that had not recommended 






This paper has shown that doctors’ decisions on the applications for DGs were 
strongly shaped by how individual doctors interpreted cases, and that the 
subjectivity that comes with being a human actor has not been eliminated by 
greater bureaucratic regulation of the system. Whether because they felt 
solidarity with an individual whom they felt deserved a grant, saw it as medically 
important that someone was able to afford nutritious food, or because they knew 
how unlikely it was that claimants with even minor disabilities were to find 
work, doctors regularly made decisions that diverged from SASSA’s guidelines. 
This did not happen in every case and given the increased strictness and 
routinisation of SASSA’s disability management system, it appears to happen 
less frequently than in the past (Kelly, 2013). Nevertheless, variation in 




about eligibility criteria. Mismatches between SASSA’s assessment model and 
the alternative frames that doctors used for thinking about disability and the 
implementation ‘gap’ that emerges as a result, reveal the limits of this model as 
well as fault lines in policy to address poverty and inequality and integrate 
disabled people into South African society. 
  
The patterns that emerge in doctors’ decision-making also reveal important 
aspects of the institutional, organisational and professional logics that structure 
doctors’ work, as well as the discourses and values that shape social 
development, health and disability policy in South Africa. The frames doctors 
used to make decisions were derived from broader discursive framings of rights, 
needs and social justice within the healthcare system and in South African 
society more broadly. The moral frame strongly aligns with popular conceptions 
of the ‘deserving’ poor; the clinical frame is shaped by professional values and 
culture, beliefs about the psychosocial aspects of care and the structure of 
healthcare system; and the social frame is rooted in the social model of disability 
and discourses of socio-economic rights.  
 
While frames help doctors cope with and manage the difficulties of making 
complex decisions in uncertain and demanding environments, this study has 
shown that doctors do not only use their discretion to make their work easier. 
They also bend the rules for people they think are deserving and or rigidly apply 
the rules in cases where they feel compelled to. This is because they are “citizen-
agents” (Maynard-Moody & Musheno, 2003), who are affected by the 
interactions that they have with claimants. Building on Maynard-Moody & 
Musheno’s definition, I argue that doctors are also professional-agents, whose 
ideas about their role as doctors and the medical ethics, norms and values they 
hold also influence their decisions and thus, policy implementation. 
Distinguishing between different frames for decision-making helps to bring 
some of the professional and bureaucratic values and demands into comparative 
perspective, showing why, in this case, doctors have been so difficult to manage 
within the SASSA system.  
 
Efforts to rationalise the assessment process that do not take the normative 
aspects and complexities of doctors’ reasoning into account only obscure the 
actual logic that doctors employ when making decisions (Meershoek et al., 
2007). Rather than enforcing rules and processes that doctors are likely to find 
unhelpful and ignore, this study highlights the need to create opportunities for 
multidisciplinary engagement with and contribution to guidelines and facilitate 
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